Monty's Normandy Hammer

Pen and Sword offers this new title on the Canadian Army in Normandy. The author, John Nelson Rickard, is a Major in the Canadian Forces with a PhD in Military History. I will spoil the conclusion here by saying this is a truly outstanding piece of work, well worth the time to read if you are interested in the Normandy campaign or the Canadian Army in WW2. 

This book covers the 2 Canadian Corps during operations ATLANTIC and SPRING. But it is so much more than that, and it's tough to tell just from the title. This is a hardcover of 224 pages, not counting the extensive appendices and footnotes. It is 'volume one' of a planned two-volume set on the Canadian army in Normandy. There are 11 maps, 12 diagrams (tables of organization for units and so forth), 18 data tables and 23 black and white photos. Modelers should be aware that this is not a photographic history with lots of new AFV photos; this is a campaign history and command study. So the photos are all of the battlefield itself and the officers whose stories are told in the book. 

The writing style is very solid, very easy to follow to the most part (with an exception I will note below), and never dull. The organization is excellent. The author begins with a chapter on General Guy Simonds' background and preparation for becoming a Corps commander. Many of the Corps commanders of WW2 (in all armies) had been field grade officers in WW1 or had at least commanded divisions in combat in WW2 prior to rising to Corps command. Simonds was too young to serve in WW1 and spent only five months in command of an infantry division in combat in Sicily and Italy. So his experience was a bit on the light side. His Corps command has been described as 'controversial', and to some extent I think the author here is trying to explain why. 

We follow with several chapters on what Corps do (very useful for those unfamiliar with army organization) , challenges of Corps command (much of which is applicable to any level of executive leadership), and General Montgomery's plan for the Normandy campaign. These chapters are really essential to what follows. A Corps is a major tactical command sitting between the Field Army level and the Division level. A Corps typically has control over several divisions, plus Corps-level assets such as artillery battalions, engineers, anti-aircraft units, signals and recon units. A Corps is a major tactical command sitting between the Field Army level and the Division level. Simonds was not blessed with excellent division commanders, nor with an experienced Corps staff, nor with experienced infantry divisions. So, he was put in a very challenging position. 

The author spends a chapter explaining Montgomery's overall strategy for the Normandy campaign, which is essential to understanding 2 Canadian Corps operations. As most readers probably know, the basic scheme for the ground campaign was to conduct holding attacks in the eastern (Second Army) sector, while breaking out in the western (First US Army) sector. The terrain in the Second Army sector was fairly open, dry and level - well suited to large mechanized operations by either side, hard to defend in, and - most important - in the direction the Allies needed to go. The few low hills and villages tended to become important features in attack and defense. Terrain in the First US Army sector was much more tightly constrained, with hundreds of very small, enclosed fields (the famous 'bocage'), very narrow roads, numerous small streams, rivers and swamps. It also faced west and south, i.e., away from Paris and Germany. This is fundamentally why the Germans defended in the west with infantry units and in the east with their armor. However, for the Allied armies to break out of Normandy and head to Germany, that armor on the eastern portion of the front needed to be fixed in place. This is the strategy behind Second Army's continual attacks; even if they did not attain their terrain objectives (and they often didn't) the constant attacks forced the Germans to continue committing their units to the Second Army front. Thus when COBRA was launched, for a few critical days the Germans had nothing in reserve to launch counterattacks. It is this need to launch repeated holding attacks - designed really to keep those German units where they were, as opposed to taking ground and progressing towards Germany - that is the background to everything 2 Canadian Corps did in Normandy.  

The real meat of the book, covering the next nine chapters, cover the planning and execution of operations SPRING and ATLANTIC. As 'holding attacks' the terrain objectives were very modest, and with only two inexperienced divisions to do the job most of the time, they had to be. 2 Canadian Corps sometimes had additional armored divisions assigned, but these were held (correctly) in reserve as exploitation forces, and did not play major roles in the tactical assault phase. It is very clear from the narrative that both divisions had a lot to learn - as did many allied units in Normandy. The Germans were tough teachers. I was struck at how many basic tactical procedures were not executed very well. Higher units often did not provide lower-level unit commanders enough time to plan; units did not even arrive at their jumping off points on time; reconnaissance was often poor or absent; patrolling was not aggressive; and I was especially struck that artillery support was not planned or executed very well. The field artillery in the British army was generally superbly managed, so it was a surprise to me to see it was not used competently or creatively in 2 Canadian Corps. Having said all that, these faults were sadly common in many of the Allied units in Normandy. 

One of many tables in the book; this is a good way to present such information

Simonds has been criticized for ruling by fear and micromanaging his subordinates. This is an issue every executive leader has to confront at some point. It's one thing to show confidence in subordinates when they excel at their jobs; it is quite another when they don't. Simonds clearly had very little confidence in his two division commanders, and from the evidence here it seems he was wise in this regard. And again, to be fair, he also had some British commanders under him who showed very poor leadership, such as Erskine and Hinde in the (British) 7th Armoured division, who were eventually relieved of command but were still in their jobs during the period covered in this book. The evidence seems solid here that Simonds generally treated his division commanders equitably given their weaknesses and the pressure on all of them to perform. 

At the end of the day the operations by 2 Canadian Corps achieved their strategic purpose in fixing German defenders in place. The painful learning curve hit some units very hard. But this happened repeatedly in WW2, in every army. It is hard to argue against FM Montgomery's conclusion that Simonds was the best commander the Canadian Army produced. 

Handy table of standard map symbols

My only critiques are the following: one, the title is odd. Aside from being difficult to pronounce (try saying it three times fast) it doesn't tell us much about what this is going to be about. I hope this review has shown that this is about the 2 Canadian Corps command in two operations in Normandy. It is also a study/evaluation of General Simonds. Second, there is a huge amount of Canadian Army terminology used here that may not be familiar to non-Canadians. The author, to his credit, defines most of the terms he uses. I am sympathetic to the notion that a certain amount of jargon is absolutely necessary to communicate with precision; at the same time, if you are trying to reach a lay audience, it has to be throttled back or better defined. Third, there are several small editing errors with text repeated verbatim from earlier sections. It is only a few sentences. A second editing error appears in the table on page 171. The numbers do not add up correctly until you see the columns have been transposed. As with almost all campaign histories, this one would benefit from more maps. 

These are pretty minor criticisms, however, and overall this is simply a terrific book, one I am very glad indeed to have read. I look forward to the next volume.     

Very Very Highly Recommended for anyone interested in the Normandy campaign or the Canadian Army.

Thanks goes out to Casemate Publishing for this review sample.

Reviewed by Dan Egan

 

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