Florence 1944: The Allied Advance in Central Italy

Osprey's latest in their 'Campaign' series is Florence 1944: The Allied Advance in Central Italy. Author Pier Paolo Battistelli has written an excellent overview here. In 93 pages, with 85 photos, three color plates and nine maps he tells the story of the Allied operations post-liberation of Rome until the liberation of Florence - essentially the summer 1944 campaign. 

The Italian campaign as a whole has often been 'forgotten' compared to the major theaters of war such as the ETO. In addition, even for a forgotten campaign, most of the attention it gets tends to center on the great struggles at Anzio and Cassino, with little attention and few publications devoted either to the strategic arguments that led to the campaign or to the post-Rome phase. Rome was liberated just before D-Day in Normandy, yet the war had nearly another year to go. 

The author charges right out of the gate in his introduction, correctly citing the fact that the fundamental problem of the entire Italian campaign was that the Allies did not agree on the strategic purpose of the campaign, and this resulted in muddled operational decisions. His conclusion follows directly from this problem: the summer 1944 fighting was a good lesson on how to conduct a delaying action and withdrawal, but not so much of a good lesson on how to conduct offensive operations. Despite massive Allied advantages, the Germans set the pace of the fighting. 

As with all 'Campaign' series books, this one has plenty of maps. Unlike many campaign histories, these maps do a good job supporting the text, with adequate detail and placement. One very odd error in the maps, though, was that they all incorrectly show the city of Florence wholly on the north side of the Arno river. Florence has occupied both banks for centuries (thus the famous bridge above). Otherwise I found the maps very helpful. 


The author begins with short sketches of the major commanders on each side, beginning of course with Fifth US Army commander Mark Clark. I am a bit surprised he did not include the British Army Group commander, Alexander, nor his Chief of Staff, General (later Field Marshal Sir) John Harding. Both played huge roles in the campaign. Harding planned Operation DIADEM, which could have cut off and destroyed major German forces if both Alexander and especially Clark had not mismanaged the execution of the plan.   

There is also a very detailed order of battle listing. This, and the campaign in general,  can be a little tricky to digest because some important units (e.g. US 3rd and 45th Divisions) began the campaign in Italy but were withdrawn to move to France. The author correctly cites the US Army's focus on the importance of Operation DRAGOON. Many of the best US units, and all the French units, in Italy were taken out of the line in Italy to participate in DRAGOON. Although some newer divisions (e.g. US 88th and 91st) were brought in, they were inexperienced. Allied forces still maintained their usual numerical advantage even with these transfers. On the German side, formations described as 'divisions' on paper were often only putting a battalion or two into the line. 





The author describes the fighting in the wake of DIADEM (the breakout from Anzio and assault up the Liri valley towards Rome) with 5th US and 8th British armies advancing slowly northward beyond Rome until reaching the region just north of Florence. It can be a bit misleading to label these armies as "US" and "British" since they were probably the most "Allied" formations of the war. The Fifth US Army included units from the US, Britain, France, Italy and Brazil; the British 8th Army included British, Canadians, South Africans and Poles.

This phase was characterized by relatively slow Allied advances; although the Allies held the initiative at the strategic level, there is no question the German defenders controlled the tempo of the tactical battle, withdrawing mostly at their own pace. Incredibly difficult terrain and German engineer obstacles slowed the advance considerably. In most of Italy, aside from a few narrow coastal areas and the huge Po valley (far to the north), the terrain is very hilly, very steep, and cut by numerous small rivers. Most hilltops have stone buildings. It is a defender's paradise. 


The author concludes, rightly in my opinion, that the failure at the highest levels of Allied command to agree on a strategy for Italy left the tactical commanders in a tough situation. They were resource-poor compared to the more important French front, and without clear goals it was difficult both to formulate operations or to know how to define success. Nor did the Germans understand what the Allied goal was; they paid too much attention to small ports on the sparsely-populated east (Adriatic) coast of Italy in the fear that the Allies might use them to mount an attack into e.g. Yugoslavia.      

I thoroughly enjoyed this one. It is unfortunately rare to read an introductory-type book such as this that does such a good job linking high level strategy across two theaters to the daily tactical operations happening. If I may be permitted a brief personal note, about twenty years ago we were fortunate enough to be in Florence, and happened to have drinks with a couple of South Africans who were tracing their grandfathers' route through Italy. We had a good time talking about the South African 6th Armoured Division in the liberation of Florence.  

Highly Recommended for all builders or anyone interested in the Italian campaign. 

Thanks goes out to Osprey Publishing for this review sample.

Reviewed by Dan Egan

 

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