Heinz Guderian
and the
Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Units

by

Jaap Jan Brouwer

Pen and Sword Military 2026

Hardcover, 237 pages

Dutch author Jaap Jan Brouwer gives us a well structured and thoughtfully written dissertation on the career of Heinz Guderian, often considered the 'father of Germany's Panzerwaffe' and his effect on German armored warfare development and doctrine during the interwar years and through World War 2.

The book is presented in hardcover, printed on high quality paper with numerous well-rendered black-and-white photographs. It is divided into twelve chapters, plus a short bibliography and index.

Chapter 1: The Early Years deals with Guderian's early life, and his service in the German Army before and during World War 1.

Chapter 2: The Development of Tank Doctine in the 1920s discusses the emergence of mobile warfare doctrine, supported by post-war technological developments and in response to the stagnant trench warfare in WW1.

Chapter 3: The Development of the Tank in the 1920s parallels the discussion of doctrine with that of early tank and mechanized transport development, including the Leichtetraktor and Grosstraktor designs produced in secret in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles.

Chapter 4: The Tank Weapon Begins to Take Shape deals with further technical and doctrinal developments during the 1930s, including the coming of Hitler, the rejection of the restrictions of Versailles, and the formation of the first Panzer Divisions. Throughout these early chapters, Brouwer highlights Guderian's role and influence, but also makes mention of other prominent figures in the development of mobile warfare in the 1930s, including Volckheim and Lutz, who exerted great influence on Guderian's thinking.

Chapter 5: German Panzer Doctrine details not only the development of German thinking around mobile warfare, but also the factors arising out of WW1 that led to this thinking. The absence of effective, centralized command and control in a fluid battle situation, gave rise to the need for commanders to develop and use their own initiative. This, combined with the emergence of mobile, mechanized units and effective radio communications, led to the development of a new form of mobile warfare, drawing on experiences from WW1 and theories from officers such as JC Fuller and BS Liddell Hart, in addition to Guderian who, with his background in communications and liaison, was well placed to take advantage of such innovations.

Chapter 6: Developments in Other Countries in the Interwar Period takes the developments in Germany in context with those in other nations including Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and France. It describes the influence of the Spanish Civil War, where different protagonists came to significantly different conclusions about the utility of armored vehicles. The chapter also describes some of the key technical developments in other nations during the interwar years.

Chapter 7: The New German Armour in Action deals with the use of German armor in the Austrian Anschluss of 1938, and the Polish Campaign of 1939. The chapter deals with Guderian's command of the 2. Panzer Division and SS-Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler during the Anschluss, and of XIX Motorized Corps for the Polish Campaign. Brouwer describes the strengths and weaknesses of the Panzerwaffe during these operations, and the lessons learned.

Chapter 8: The Campaign in the West covers the campaign against France and the Lowlands in the spring of 1940, balancing the topic of Guderian's role with a broader description of the role of the armored forces during the campaign. It also covers the initial disagreements between Guderian and von Kluge regarding the proper use of the Panzer units, which would lead to an all-out feud between the two commanders in later years.

Chapter 9: The Eastern Front begins with Operation Barbarossa, including a detailed discussion of the state of the German Wermacht, along with tank inventory and production, at the time. It contrasts this with the state of the Red Army's tank forces, and their doctrine. Brouwer describes the three Army Groups involved in Barbarossa, the difficulties faced by German forces in operating over the vast distances of the Soviet Union, and the catastrophic influence of the weather in the later months of 1941 and into 1942. Guderian attempted to intervene personally with Hitler to improve the conditions for his troops, but his pleas fell on deaf ears and he was relieved of his command.

Chapter 10: Guderian as Inspektor-General der PanzerTruppen takes a slight detour to deal with the strategic events of 1942 and their effect on the Panzerwaffe, before returning to Guderian himself, and his appointment as Inspektor-General der PanzerTruppen in February 1943. The chapter deals with Guderian's approach to managing his Inspektorat, and his plans for returning the Panzerwaffe to its old glory by streamlining the production of existing weapon systems as well as the development and production of new ones.

Chapter 11: Chief of the General Staff begins with the assassination attempt against Hitler in July 1944, and its effect on composition of the German High Command. Hitler no longer trusted the majority of his generals, and Guderian was one of the few exceptions, though Brouwer makes the case that even Guderian must have been aware of various plots. Nevertheless, Guderian was appointed Chief of the General Staff, though his role was essentially that of a pawn to Hitler, who increasingly made all the decisions. The chapter parallels these developments with the military and industrial situation in Germany at the time, including the rapid growth of armored vehicle production as a result of initiatives begun the previous year. It was too late to stem the decline of German's war fortunes, however. In the final weeks of the war, Guderian was placed on sick leave, partly because of his chronic heart problems and partly because he no longer had a useful command function to perform within the rapidly disintegrating Third Reich.

Chapter 12: Guderian: A Retrospective summarizes the entire book with a recap of Guderian's career and his influence on German tank doctrine, development and tactics leading up to, and during WW2. Brouwer is evidently impressed by Guderian's achievements, but also shows an appreciation of his political naivety, particularly in dealing with figures within the Nazi regime, a shortcoming that led to several setbacks over the course of his career.

The book provides a sufficient depth of discussion to be meaningful, without going into excruciating detail on the drier aspects of military doctrine and technology. In this way, Brouwer maintains a balance between thoroughly examining the topic, and preserving readability. This reviewer found the book to be fast paced, informative and occasionally surprising in its content.

Highly Recommended for those with an interest in the development and deployment of German armored warfare doctrine during WW2.

Thanks goes out to Casemate Publishing for the review copy of the book.

Reviewed by Neil Stokes

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